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Abstract. We present a 625 MHz clocked coherent one-way quantum key
distribution (QKD) system which continuously distributes secret keys over an optical
fibre link. To support high secret key rates, we implemented a fast hardware key
distillation engine which allows for key distillation rates up to 4 Mbps in real time. The
system employs wavelength multiplexing in order to run over only a single optical fibre
and is compactly integrated in 19-inch 2U racks. We optimized the system considering
a security analysis that respects finite-key-size effects, authentication costs, and system
errors. Using fast gated InGaAs single photon detectors, we reliably distribute secret
keys with rates up to 140 kbps and over 25 km of optical fibre, for a security parameter
of εQKD = 4 · 10−9.
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1. Introduction
Today’s society relies heavily on confidential and authenticated communication.
Encryption and authentication can be realized with provable information-theoretic
security, derived from Shannon’s theory [1]. This means that even an adversary
who has unlimited computing powers can decipher an encrypted message or forge an
authenticated message only with arbitrarily small probabilities. To date, the only
message encryption scheme that has been proven information-theoretically secure [1]
is the Vernam one-time pad cipher [2]. Secure message authentication has been
demonstrated for schemes utilizing universal hash functions [3, 4]. The fundamental
resources of these schemes are random and secret strings of bits, shared between the
two distant parties commonly known as Alice and Bob. Hence, information-theoretically
secure communication necessitates continuous distribution of random secret keys with
provable security. Classically, the generation of two identical key streams of truly
random bits at two distinct locations relies on the assumption of a secure channel or
public-key cryptography. However, their security is based on certain assumptions, such
as the difficulty to factorize large composite integers, or to compute discrete logarithms
in certain finite groups.
A completely different approach is quantum key distribution (QKD), introduced in
1984 by Bennett and Brassard [5] (see Ref. [6] for a review). The idea is to send random
bits encoded on non-orthogonal states of single photons. The security is based on
the laws of quantum mechanics, in particular the no-cloning theorem which forbids the
creation of identical copies of unknown quantum states and the fact that a measurement
of an unknown quantum state inevitably disturbs it. Subsequent authenticated
communication between Alice and Bob enables a measure of the information an
eavesdropper potentially possesses, and hence, its reduction. Seen in this light, QKD
is essentially a key expansion scheme, that is, a short initial authentication key is
sufficient to generate continuously new information-theoretically secure keys [6]. Most
importantly, the secret keys generated by QKD are universally composable, which
allows one to partially reuse them for authenticating the distillation processes of
subsequent QKD rounds. Remaining bits are then available for message encryption and
authentication. QKD may also be used to enhance security of cryptography schemes
based on computational complexity, e.g., AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) can
benefit from regularly refreshed encryption keys.
Since the mid 1990’s, QKD has progressed rapidly in several aspects. Starting
from the early demonstration of feasibility experiments [7, 8], faster and faster (with bit
rates on the order of Mbps [9, 10]) and long reaching systems (up to 250km [11, 12])
have been developed. However, most of the early experiments focused only on the
physical layer: photon generation, manipulation, transmission and detection. Even up
to today, systems which include all necessary components for secure and fast QKD are
rare. Indeed, those components are numerous and need multidisciplinary competences
(see Fig. 4). Important and often forgotten parts include random number generation,
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real-time error correction and privacy amplification, secure authentication and finite-key
security analysis.
In this paper, we present the results of a project [13] whose ambition was to
implement a complete and practical fiber based QKD prototype in collaboration
between six research teams in Switzerland. In particular we put the emphasis on
continuous operation with a wavelength multiplexed service channel for synchronization
and distillation, efficient hardware real-time distillation, finite-key security analysis, and
frugal authentication. In section 1, we present the heart of any QKD prototype, the
FPGA based engine controlling all the hardware as well as the complete key distillation
and authentication process. This QKD engine can be adapted to many QKD protocols.
In section 2, we briefly present the employed “coherent one-way” (COW) protocol and
its specific opto-electronic realisation. Section 3 presents the experimental results and
a discussion.
2. QKD engine
The QKD system described in the following was designed to have the flexibility to adapt
to different QKD implementations and protocols. A schematic of our implementation
is shown in Fig. 1. It is built around FPGAs (field programmable gate array, Xilinx
Virtex 6) and manages the fast interfaces for the optical components, the classical
communication channels, all the sub-protocols which accompany QKD as well as the
distribution of the generated secret keys. The choice of the various parameters as
well as all the algorithms used for key distillation and authentication processes have
been carefully chosen by taking into account various trade-offs between engineering and
cost constraints. Importantly, we have taken special care to analyse and optimise all
tasks with respect to reducing the requirements and resources such that only one single
FPGA is needed in each device. In general, compromises had to be found between
the post-processing key size (≥ 105 bits), as required in finite-key scenarios analyzed
in Appendix A, and limits imposed by the hardware in terms of memory size and
throughput. A personal computer (PC) is connected to each FPGA via PCI Express
to access the configuration, status and monitoring registers. The final secret key can
be transfered from the key manager to this PC and further distributed to external
applications. Two communication links are established, a one-way quantum channel and
a bidirectional classical service channel. All channels can be wavelength-multiplexed on
a single fibre using DWDM. In the following, we describe in more detail the functionality
of each module of our QKD engine. For a more complete (and technical) description of
the architecture of the code and the used algorithms, please refer to [14].
Quantum channel interface module: Two digital 1.25 Gbps serial interface
transceivers at each FPGA (for Alice and Bob) allow synchronised interconnection
with the optical hardware of the quantum channel. At Alice, they output up to
two parallel streams of digital on-off pulses with adjustable amplitude and width,
which are used to drive an electro-optical modulator for quantum state preparation.
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Figure 1. Schematic of our optical implementation for the coherent one-way QKD
protocol and the key distillation procedures implemented in the fast FPGA hardware.
For the implementation of the COW protocol as presented later, one transceiver is
needed to drive an intensity modulator. Using the second transceiver as well, one can
control a dual-drive modulator and prepare all quantum states required by BB84 or the
differential phase-shift (DPS) protocol, as we have shown in [15]. At Bob’s device, both
digital transceivers are used, each connected to one single photon detector SPDD and
SPDM, respectively. They provide the detector gate trigger if needed, and receive the
detection signals from the corresponding single photon detector. Digital delays with
10 ps resolution allow temporal alignment of the detector gates with respect to the
quantum signals, and temporal alignment of the detection signals with respect to Bob’s
FPGA clock.
Service channel interface module: Two optical 2.5 Gbps SFP (Small
form-factor pluggable) transceivers (Finisar) on each side establish a bidirectional
classical communication link between Alice and Bob. All tasks which are needed to
continuously generate secret keys or to further use these keys, share this link employing
temporal multiplexing. These tasks requiring classical communication comprise in
particular synchronisation, alignment, sifting, parameter estimation, error correction
and verification, privacy amplification, authentication, key management, encryption,
administration, and logging. Some of them strictly require authentication, some of
them encryption, or even both as discussed later. The priority of each task, as well
as the allocated communication bandwidth, can be adjusted individually. We employ
dense wavelength-division multiplexing to transmit all classical communication channels
together with the quantum channel simultaneously over a single fibre. The FPGA
system clock of Bob is synchronised and phase stabilised with some 10 ps precision with
the master clock at Alice. All other necessary frequencies are derived from this clock,
most importantly Alice’s quantum state modulation frequency and Bob’s detector gate
frequency.
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Figure 2. Number of bits per detection which have to be sent from Bob to Alice for
detection times and base sifting. Blue corresponds to short sifting blocks optimised
for detection probabilities > 0.021, red uses longer sifting blocks optimised for lower
detection probabilities. For comparison, the minimum amount given by the Shannon
limit is shown in yellow (dashed).
Sifting and sampling module: This module realises sifting of incompatible
detections and optionally parameter estimation. Sifting comprises essentially three
steps. First, since a large fraction of photons is lost in the fibre link or is not detected,
Bob discloses which of the qubits he detected, without revealing the detected bit
value. Second, Bob announces for each detection his randomly chosen measurement
basis. Finally, Alice responds for each detection whether or not to discard it due to
incompatible preparation and measurement basis. The first two sifting steps have to
be performed as fast as possible in order to allow Alice to sift out undetected and
incompatible bits from her memory before exceeding the available buffer size. In each
sifting block, Bob encodes the detection time index of a detection relative to the index of
the previous detection. Additionally, he attaches to each sifting block two control bits,
which are used to indicate either the measurement basis for each detection, or empty
blocks when no detection occurred during the maximum time that can be encoded in a
single sifting block.
The amount of bits exchanged during sifting has to be kept as small as possible,
since this communication has to be authenticated at the cost of secret bits. The longer
the fibre, the more bits are needed to indicate the time (number of clock cycles) passed
between two succeeding detections. We switch to 14 bits instead of 6, for detection
probabilities smaller than 2 · 10−2 per gate. As shown in Fig. 2, our way to encode
the time information is very efficient (less than twice the Shannon limit) for detections
probabilities between 10−1 − 10−4 per gate.
Some QKD protocols, e.g. COW, use only one basis to obtain the raw key. All
detection outcomes in the second basis are publicly revealed in order to estimate the
phase error of the received quantum states. Bob reveals these measurement outcomes
in the two control bits, too. If parameter estimation based on randomly revealing a
fraction of detection outcomes is required for the quantum bit error rate (QBER) in
the raw key, optionally a third control bit can be sent per detection. However, for the
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results we present here, we omit such sampling in favor of a more efficient solution as
described below.
If double detections occur in both detectors at the same time, we only keep the
result from one detector, e.g. for COW the data detector SPDD. If double detections
occur in both time-bins of the same qubit, we assign a randomly chosen value. A
logical deadtime between 8 ns and 10 µs can be applied after detection, during which
all detection are discarded to reduce impairment due to detector afterpulsing.
Error correction and verification module: Due to practical limitations in the
preparation of the quantum states, and due to detector noise and jitter, Bob’s sifted
key differs from Alice’s original key even in absence of eavesdropping. Therefore, a
forward error correction (FEC) code is implemented in the FPGA as described in [16],
which uses the quasi-cyclic LDPC (Low-density parity-check) code defined in [17]. Error
correction based on LDPC codes uses syndrome encoding with the advantage that only
non-iterative one-way communication is required. Moreover, it’s efficiency in terms
of revealed information can in principle approach the Shannon limit. Our FPGA
implementation for LDPC performs forward error correction on blocks of 1944 bits
length and provides rates up to 235 Mbps at 62.5 MHz clock frequency with ten decoding
iterations. The LDPC code rate, i.e., the fraction of unpublished information, can be set
to fEC (Q) ∈ {1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 5/6} to adapt to the expected error rates. Bob calculates
all syndromes for a constant expected error rate, and forwards them to Alice through
an authenticated channel. Alice performs syndrome decoding and checks the parity. If
an error occurred, the corresponding block is discarded. However, there is still a certain
probability that uncorrected errors remain after error correction, especially for error
rates larger than 6 % (see Fig. 3, left). To detect remaining errors, we implement a
subsequent verification step, where Bob transmits a 48-bit hash checksum per LDPC
code block to Alice. The checksums are generated using polynomial hashing [3, 4],
with a new random 48-bit seed for each checksum. The universal hash function is
randomly chosen, and the collision probability on at least one of 512 subsequent blocks
(corresponding to 995,328 bits input length for privacy amplification) is upper-bounded
by εVER ≤ 7.7 · 10−11. For each block, the hash, as well as the random choice of hash
function, are sent to Alice. If a checksum mismatch occurs, the associated block is
discarded. Fig. 3 (left) shows for all implemented code rates the probability that a
verification fails as a function of the measured raw QBER.
Bit error estimation module: In every QKD protocol the amount of errors of
the received quantum states has to be estimated in order to determine an upper bound
on the fraction of information which could have leaked to an eavesdropper. The standard
procedure consists in random sampling of a subset of the sifted key, comparing the bit
values over an authenticated channel, and calculating the error rate in each basis. While
straightforward, this method reduces the final secret key rate as all revealed outcomes
have to be discarded. Most importantly, it has a substantial impact for a finite-key
analysis, since a small sample gives only an imprecise estimate on the true error rate in
the remaining, unrevealed detections.
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Figure 3. Left: Measurement results for different code rates showing the probability
that the comparison between Alice and Bob’s verification hash tags indicates at least
one remaining error per 2048 bit block of error corrected keys. Right: Effective QBER
under the conservative assumption that during each block with verification hash failure
the eavesdropping attacks induced an error rate of 1/2.
To overcome these impairments, we perform parameter estimation exploiting our
knowledge about the correctness of the key after verification. Once we obtain 512 blocks
of 1944 error corrected and verified bits, Alice compares them with her original random
bit sequence [18]. By counting the total number of mismatches, an exact number
for the true bit errors is obtained. Additionally, we take into account blocks which
were dropped due to checksum mismatches during error verification. We conservatively
assume for each block with verification hash failure a maximum error rate of 1/2 induced
by eavesdropping attacks. In Fig. 3 (right) we show the resulting, effective QBER for
different code rates as a function of the measured QBER. The failure probability for
parameter estimation is then equal to the failure probability of error verification, i.e.,
εPE ≤ 7.7 · 10−11.
Privacy amplification module: Our FPGA implementation of privacy
amplification uses Toeplitz hashing [3, 4], a construction for families of universal hash
functions, in combination with LFSR hashing as proposed in [19, 20]. This approach is
very efficient in terms of communication bandwidth needed to convey the chosen hash
function, and allows parallelised computation and efficient, scalable implementation on
the FPGA hardware.
The privacy amplification compression is the ratio between the length of the output
and input keys, i.e., the ratio between the number of rows and columns of the Toeplitz
matrix. In order to obtain high secret key rates based on finite-key analysis, we choose
a fixed input length of 995,328 bits. As a consequence of this large block size, the
size of the resulting matrix is such that it has to be stored in an SDRAM outside the
FPGA. Our hardware implementation for privacy amplification has shown to treat up
to 48 Mbps input rate. Changing the output block length, the compression ratio can
be adjusted over the full range between 0− 100 % in steps of 0.05 %. We optimise and
fix the compression ratio once in advance for a given scenario. Then, we verify for each
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key that the parameter estimates are indeed within the limits which guarantee security
with the chosen compression ratio.
Authentication module: The classical communication channel is authenticated
in order to prevent an eavesdropper from forging messages, which would open the door
for man-in-the-middle attacks. For information-theoretically secure authentication, we
use a combination [21] of εAUT-almost strongly universal hash functions in combination
with a strongly-universal family of hash functions named polynomial hashing [3, 4],
which is very efficient with respect to consumed secret bits as well as required operations.
Bob randomly and secretly selects a hash function from this family to calculate a hash
tag for each transmitted message, and sends the hash tags together with the messages
to Alice. To verify that the transmission has not been forged, Alice has to know which
hash functions Bob has chosen to be able to verify the hash tags for the received
messages. Only when her calculated and the received tag for a message match, then it is
considered valid. We send a new 127-bit authentication tag for every 220 bits of classical
communication to obtain a collision probability of εAUT ≤ 10−33. This approach would
require 383 secret bits to select a new hash function for every tag. However, recently it
has been shown that the same hash function can be reused for multiple authentication
rounds if the tags attached to the messages [22] are one-time pad encrypted. This
authentication scheme is proven ε-universal-composable-secure even if ε-almost strongly
universal2 hash functions are used and provides a bound for its information leakage. This
strategy reduces the secret key consumption to one third, since only 127 bit secret keys
are needed to encrypt each tag instead of 383 secret bits to select a new hash function.
Random number generation module: Random numbers are extensively needed
during preparation for selecting the quantum states, as well as during key distillation,
e.g., to generate the privacy amplification matrices. These random bits must be
provided by true quantum random number generators, ideally quantum random number
generators (QRNGs) where up to 2 GHz output rates have been demonstrated [23] to
date. However for the time being, we use a commercial QRNG [24] (certified by Swiss
Federal Office of Metrology). Since its bit rate of 4 Mbps is by far not sufficient,
we implement the NIST SP800-90 recommended AES-CTR cryptographically secure
pseudo-random number generator that uses seeds of 256 bits provided by the QRNG to
generate up to 1.1 Gbps random bits. We note that due to AES, the random number
expansion protocol is the only part of the entire system for which we can’t provide an
information-theoretic security statement.
Key manager: A fraction of the privacy amplified, secret keys is transfered by the
key manager to the authentication module. Once their authenticity has been verified, the
key manager distributes the remaining keys to an internal OTP encryption application,
or via a PCI Express link to a PC and further to external consumers, e.g network
encryptors.
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3. COW protocol and implementation
The presented QKD system provides the flexibility to drive different QKD protocols
[15]. In the following, we present the implementation of the coherent one-way (COW)
protocol [25].
The COW protocol belongs to the class of distributed phase reference protocols
and seeks to enable long fibre distance QKD while maintaining a simple and convenient
setup. The advantages of the COW protocol are that it allows implementation of
a completely passive receiver, without any active element for base choice, requiring
only two single photon detectors. Its implementation is robust against birefringence
fluctuations, fibre transmission losses and photon number splitting attacks. A schematic
of the setup is sketched in Fig. 1.
Following the COW protocol, Alice encodes each bit value by the choice of sending
a weak coherent pulse in one out of two possible time-bins, while the other time-
bin contains the vacuum state. Formally, these quantum states can be written as
|β0〉n = |α〉2n |vac〉2n-1 and |β1〉n = |vac〉2n |α〉2n-1, where α is the complex coherent state
amplitude with an average photon number per time bin µ = |α|2 < 1, and n labels the
qubit index. These states can be discriminated optimally by a simple time-of-arrival
measurement. In addition, a third state called decoy sequence with both time-bins
containing weak coherent pulses is randomly prepared, i.e. |βd〉n = |α〉2n |α〉2n-1.
As for distributed-phase-reference QKD, the integrity of the quantum channel is
monitored using an imbalanced interferometer. It measures the coherence between
pulses in two successive, non-empty time-bins, either within a bit when a decoy sequence
was prepared, or across bit separation whenever corresponding sequences are prepared.
Latter measurement across bit separation renders photon number splitting attacks on
individual states less powerful as the adversary reduces the interference visibility if
trying to discriminate individual states. As a consequence, the optimal average number
of photons which can be sent per qubit becomes independent of the fibre transmission,
but dependent on QBER and visibility. Security against zero error attacks and restricted
collective attacks was proven, including imperfections of the state preparation [26]. Note,
that a general security proof was obtained for a modified COW protocol [27], which,
however, involves more intricate hardware.
Alice’s optical QKD module: The coherent light source is a continuous-wave
distributed feedback laser diode (Agilecom) with a sufficiently long coherence time
of > 300 ns. It is compatible with 100 GHz DWDM telecom standard, and its central
wavelength regulated by a thermo-electric controller (TEC) to λ = 1551.72 nm (ITU
channel 32) [28].
An integrated LiNbO3 intensity modulator (IM, Photline MX-LN 20) prepares the
COW states. It tailors the continuous optical signal in a coherent train of short pulses,
according to the states selected by the random number generator. The corresponding
digital on-off signals are provided through the high-speed serial interfaces of the FPGA,
reshaped to clean pulses of 50− 400 ps duration, and amplified to appropriate voltage
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levels for the IM input. The bias voltage is adjusted to maximise the optical pulse
extinction ratio. Indeed, the extinction ratio of the IM limits the minimum quantum
bit error rate since spurious light in a supposedly empty time bin causes erroneous
detections. Therefore, we use the QBER as feedback to re-adjust the IM bias voltage
continuously. More than 25 dB extinction is achieved for 130 ps long pulses at a
frequency of 625 MHz, limiting the expected QBER to 0.3 %. Decoy sequences are
prepared with a probability of 15.5 %, close to the optimum, which allows for a sifted
key rate as high as 73 % of the raw key rate.
A MEMS based variable optical attenuator (Sercalo) attenuates the quantum signal
down to the optimal photon level at Alice’s output. Its value is optimised with respect
to the QBER, visibility and other parameters as discussed later. The optical isolator
prevents Trojan horse attacks (based on sending bright light from the outside). A
90:10 imbalanced fibre coupler and tap monitor diode allow continuous monitoring of
Alice’s output power and providing feedback to the variable optical attenuator to adjust
the average number of photons per bit. Moreover, an unexpected increase of power
in the monitor diode would indicate malfunction or a Trojan horse attack. Finally, a
fixed, calibrated optical attenuator just before Alice’s output reduces the average photon
number per pulse to the optimal value.
Bob’s optical QKD module: At Bob’s quantum channel input, an optical
isolator prevents information leakage due to detector backfiring or back-reflection of
potential Trojan horse attacks. A 45 pm spectral fibre Bragg grating (FBG, aos)
filter with 1.4 dB insertion loss and 14 dB isolation reduces incoming Raman noise.
Subsequently, a fibre coupler realises the passive, random base choice and splits the
quantum signals towards data and monitoring line. Its splitting ratio of 80:20 is close
to optimal for most experimental settings used in the following.
Two single photon detectors are installed: SPDD measures the photon arrival time
in the data line to obtain the raw key, SPDM detects the output of the imbalanced
interferometer (IF) in the monitoring line. For the results presented in sec. 4, SPDD
is a sine gated InGaAs avalanche photo diode (APD) with a frequency of 1.25 GHz as
described in [29]. Its gate width (FWHM) is 130 ps which proves to be a good tradeoff
between sufficiently low afterpulsing while maintaining a good detection efficiency. The
efficiency is varied in the range of 6-10 %, maximising the final secret key rate. For the
considered fibre distances, the dark counts are no limiting factor and the highest key
rate was indeed obtained at room temperature (20◦C). At this temperature, the dark
count probability is about 10−6 per gate at 10 % efficiency.
As the monitoring detection rate is much smaller, SPDM is a free-running negative
feedback InGaAs APD [30]. Applying 20 µs deadtime, its dark count rate was typically
800 Hz at 20 % detection efficiency. Importantly, its timing jitter is only 200 ps
(FWHM), sufficiently low to discriminate time-bins at 1.25 GHz. The gate times for
both detectors are derived from the clock signal distributed over the service channel,
and are digitally delayed to compensate for any temporal delay between quantum and
service channel.
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Figure 4. Photo of the opened QKD devices. Each system is compatible with
19-inch 2U industrial cases and houses all the electronics, optics and interfaces
to distribute quantum keys, use the QKD keys for Ethernet authentication and
one-time pad encryption, and to additionally supply them to external consumers
devices. In consideration of security aspects, their interior is completely mechanically
encapsulated, while thermal stabilisation is provided by two external fans. Using
external 19-inch 1U DWDM modules (bottom), both devices were connected by only
one single telecom fibre and have demonstrated stable QKD functionality with a
security guarantee of εQKD = 4 · 10−9 over more than 25 km distance.
The Michelson type IF as sketched in Fig. 1 is made up of a fibre coupler with
two Faraday mirrors terminating the two arms. The arms are cut such that its length
difference corresponds to half of the separation between consecutive time bins. The
measured free-spectral range of 1.247 GHz matches very well the target frequency
of 1.25 GHz. The IF has 1.3 dB insertion loss, and a maximum visibility > 0.998.
It is thermally well isolated and actively temperature stabilised. The relative phase,
however, is adjusted by tuning Alice’s laser wavelength such that two succeeding pulses
interfere destructively and don’t generate detector clicks. In contrary, non-interfering
pulse sequences are distributed randomly between the two output ports of the IF. Note,
the second output port can be monitored via an additional circulator at the cost of
increased insertion loss and the need of a third detector. This would slightly increase
the secret key fraction, as Eve’s information could be estimated more precisely.
Mechanical housing and DWDM modules: Each QKD device is integrated
in a 19-inch 2U housing as shown in Fig. 4. It provides a power input, a single mode
fibre connector (APC) for the quantum channel, a PCI-Express link to the control
PC, and two SFP slots for the service channel and an optional external encryptor.
Importantly, despite these connectors the mechanical housing is perfectly encapsulated
from the environment to prevent any other physical attack point than through the
optical fibre. In particular, the arrangement of all components has been carefully chosen
to maintain an efficient heat release and to guarantee maximum stability, although the
cooling air flows only outside around the device without entering it.
During all key exchanges presented here, we used one single optical fibre and
dense wavelength-division multiplexing (DWDM) for quantum and all classical channels.
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Figure 5. Left: Secret key rates after privacy amplification (blue circles) and
authenticated secret key rate (purple triangles) which accounts for secret key
consumption for authenticating the classical communication channel. We considered a
security analysis that respects finite-key-size effects, authentication costs, and system
errors with a security parameter of εQKD = 4 · 10−9. Right: QBER and raw visibility
results before removing dark counts.
We implemented external DWDM modules for Alice and Bob in separate 19-inch 1U
cases, comprising a 100 GHz multiplexer (OptiWorks) and a variable optical attenuator
(OptoLink) to minimise the power of the transmitted classical channels. The
multiplexers have an isolation of 80 dB and an insertion loss of 1.8 dB.
4. Experimental results
We tested the system over fibre lengths between 1−50 km using rapid sine gated single
photon detectors [29] as well as free-running single photon detectors (id220, IDQ). All
classical and quantum communication channels were multiplexed onto a common fibre.
Using different configurations of the distillation engine we optimised the key rates for
a security parameter of 4 · 10−9, while respecting a security analysis for finite-key-size
effects, authentication costs, and system errors.
For the measurements which we discuss in the following, we obtained the highest
secret key rate using an LDPC error correction code rate of 3/4, parameter estimation
based on key comparison, and longer sifting blocks to encode the detection times in
14 bits. The secret key rate which is provided by the FPGA distillation engine after
privacy amplification, is shown in Fig. 5 (left, circle). Multiplexing quantum and
classical channels over a single 1 km fibre, secret keys were distributed at a rate of
144.5 kbps. Over a single 25 km long fibre, we obtained after privacy amplification a
secret key rate of 22.5 kbps. The useful rate of secret bits available for applications,
e.g., internal one-time-pad encryption or external encryptors is shown as red triangle in
Fig. 5 and accounts for secret bit consumption to encode the authentication tags.
Parameter optimisation: For each setting we optimised several parameters to
maximise the final authenticated secret key rate. These are summarised in Table 1. For
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Figure 6. Key rates (left), QBER and visibility (right) demonstrating the stability of
an autonomous QKD run for a period of more than 11 hours. Alice’s and Bob’s devices
were connected by a single 12.5 km fibre. The secret key rate (left, red) accounts for
finite-key effects, the authenticated key rate (left, purple) for the consumption of secret
keys to encrypt the authentication tags.
longer fibres, the average photon number was increased and the detection efficiency
decreased in order to compensate for increasing impairment due to DWDM noise
(Raman scattering and crosstalk) and dark counts. Such, the quantum bit error rate
was maintained close to the maximum QBER which could be efficiently corrected with
the chosen LDPC code rate (see Fig. 3). For the different fibre lengths we obtained a
QBER (before subtracting dark counts) as shown in Fig. 5 (right). The QBER increases
for longer fibres and is considerably larger than the error rate which we estimated using
sub-sampling instead. This additional contribution stems from blocks of error corrected
bits, which haven’t passed the subsequent hash tag verification. For these blocks we
conservatively attribute a-priori an error rate of 1/2 to the eavesdropper. Thus, with
a verification failure probability of 3.1 % for a 25 km fibre, the QBER which we take
into account increases above 3.4 %. Nevertheless, we verified that in the presented
configurations the final secret key rate was still higher compared to configurations with
parameter estimation based on sub-sampling, since the impairment due to verification
failures is overcompensated by the advantage that no bits have to be revelead and
discarded. Similarly, we found that smaller error correction code rates did not result in
higher key rates.
The raw visibility (before subtracting dark counts) in Fig. 5 (right, red) remains
almost constant for all fibre lengths. It slightly drops below 97 % for long fibres due to
increasing impairment stemming from DWDM noise and dark count detections. Mainly
determined by the visibility and photon number, and with slight dependence on the
QBER, we applied privacy amplification with a compression factor of 11.5 % for a fibre
of 1 km length, which dropped to 6.5 % for 25 km. Stability: In Fig. 6 we show the
stability in terms of key rates, QBER and visibility for an autonomous QKD run over
a period of more than 11 hours using a single 12.5 km DWDM fibre link. The results
clearly reflect the good stability of all system components including synchronisation and
alignment, Alice’s state preparation, Bob’s interferometer and single photon detectors,
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Fibre length [km] 1 km 12.5 km 25 km
Pulse amplitude µ 0.089 0.084 0.105
Detection efficiency [%] 9.6 7.3 6.9
Compression factor [%] 11.5 12.0 6.5
LDPC code rate 3/4 3/4 3/4
QBER [%] (raw/verified) 1.70± 0.01 / 1.98 1.87± 0.02 / 3.03 1.91± 0.03 / 3.42
Dark count contribution 0.41 0.76 0.85
DWDM noise contribution 0.05 0.11 0.19
Raw visibility [%] 98.14± 0.14 98.06± 0.13 97.81± 0.13
Sifted key rate [bps] (1.26± 0.006) · 106 (5.38± 0.032) · 105 (3.59± 0.042) · 105
Secret key rate [bps] 1.45 · 105 6.29 · 104 2.25 · 104
Authenticated key rate [bps] 1.41 · 105 6.12 · 104 2.14 · 104
Table 1. Parameters and measurement results summarizing the performance of the
QKD prototype for information theoretic secure key distribution with an security
parameter of 4 · 10−9.
and the whole distillation engine. The average raw quantum bit error rate as measured
by comparing Alice’s error corrected key with her original key was 1.91 % over the whole
measurement period (Fig. 6, right). The raw visibility before subtracting dark counts
had an average of 98.1 %, and was constantly above 97.0 %. Considering finite-key
security with εQKD = 4 · 10−9, we applied a compression factor of 0.12, and accounting
for the fraction of blocks which were discarded due to verification failures, the resulting
secret key rate was 62.9 kbps.
During two live presentations at conferences, we have demonstrated the robustness,
stability and reliability of our QKD system [31, 32]. Over periods of 2 and 5 days, the
system ran continuously and provided more than 30 times per second new secret 128-bit
keys to network encryptors, which used the keys for AES encryption of user data and
video streams.
Authentication costs: The secret key rates usually presented are the key rates
after privacy amplification, i.e., they do not account for secret bit consumption to encode
the authentication tags. Therefore, Fig. 7 shows the amount of classical communication
accompanying key distillation as well as the fraction of secret bits which are consumed to
encrypt authentication tags of 127 bit per 106 bits of classical communication. The left
side of Fig. 7 shows the amount of classical information which has to be communicated
normalised per secret bit, as well as in terms of authenticated fraction of secret bits
which is left after authentication. It reveals, that for all considered fibre lengths, the
least fraction of secret bits consumed for authentication is obtained if we use long sifting
blocks and parameter estimation based on key comparison (circles). For a fibre of 1 km
length, 217 classical bits have to be communicated per secret bit. Correspondingly, a
fraction of 2.7 % of secret bits is needed for authenticating this communication, i.e.
the authenticated key rate amounts to 97.3 %. It increases up to 412 bits of classical
communication per secret bit for a 25 km fibre, where 5.0 % of secret bits are needed
for authentication, corresponding to a authenticated key rate of 95.0 %. Much more
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Figure 7. Amount of classical information accompanying QKD. Left: Total
communication rates per secret bit and fraction of secret bits remaining after
authenticating the classical communication channels. At least 2.7 % of secret bits
are consumed for authentication, i.e., to encrypt the authentication tags of 127 bits
per 106 bits of classical communication. Right: Communication rates broken down by
individual sub-protocols for the considered fibre lengths. The rates are dominated by
the amount of sifting information sent from Bob to Alice which adds up to 94− 99 %,
depending on the specific configuration.
classical information has to be sent and authenticated, if short sifting blocks with only
6 bits instead of 14 bits are used to encode the detection times, and nearly 20 % of all
secret bits are consumed for authentication (triangles in Fig. 7).
The origin of the different authentication losses is illustrated in Fig. 7 (right), where
we compare the communication rates broken down by each individual sub-protocol.
With more than 94 % the largest amount of information is sent for sifting. More than one
order of magnitude less, up to 4.5 %, for communicating the randomly chosen Toeplitz
matrices for privacy amplification. At most 1.2 % of all classical communication is
attributed to error correction including communication of the verification hash function
and value, and less than 0.1 % for authentication. Using shorter sifting blocks (triangles
in Fig. 7), the relative amount of sifting information becomes even larger, giving raise to
larger authentication loss. However, we expect that the shorter blocks used to encode
the detection times become advantageous as soon as higher detection rates are obtained.
This would be the case when detectors with higher detection efficiency are used, e.g.,
superconducting single photon detectors, or two fibre links instead of one, which would
eliminate optical losses in multiplexers and spectral filters. When we used parameter
estimation based on sub-sampling instead of key comparison, the amount of classical
communication was 12.6 % larger for all fibre lengths, corresponding to the fraction of
bits which were revealed and discarded.
5. Conclusions and outlook
To conclude, we have presented a fully integrated versatile QKD platform that
comprises of a hardware key distillation engine, dense wavelength-division multiplexing
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of quantum and all classical communication channels, and fast sine gating detectors. We
demonstrated its stable performance for the coherent one-way protocol, and rigorously
took into account all aspects which guarantee security in finite key scenarios with a
security parameter of 4 · 10−9. Our QKD platform has the flexibility to not only
support the coherent one-way protocol, but additionally provides all the means to run
the differential phase-shift QKD protocol, as well as phase-time qubit BB84. The system
is compactly mounted in standard industrial 19-inch 2U housings.
All results were obtained using a 1-fibre DWDM configuration with all quantum
and classical communication channels multiplexed in one common fibre, and taking into
account finite key security for a block size of 106 bits. However, we want to stress that
depending on the specific usage scenario and security requirements, the maximum secret
key rate as well as the maximum fibre length can easily be increased. As an example, we
performed the same set of measurements while neglecting finite-key effects, and obtained
after authentication an asymptotic key rate of 293 kbps and 1.3 kbps for a fibre length
of 1 km and 50 km, respectively. A further increase by more than a factor of two in
both, key rate and distance, can be expected if instead of multiplexing all channels over
one single fibre, two fibres are available, one dark fibre for the quantum channel and a
second fibre for the classical communication channels.
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Appendix A. COW finite-key rates
We consider a coherent one-way transmitter at Alice as depicted in Fig. 1 which prepares
time-bin qubits with a frequency fQ. In general, the prepared quantum state after a
time tN = N /fQ can be written in the form of a product state
|Ψ〉
N
= ⊗Nn=1 |ψ (bn, vn)〉n (A.1)
|ψ (bn, vn)〉n = ⊗nbit−1i=0 |α (bn, vn, i)〉n·nbit−i (A.2)
of coherent quantum states |α〉τ . Their complex amplitudes α in temporal mode τ
depends on Alice’s random choice of basis bn ∈ {0, 1} and bit value vn ∈ {0, 1}. We
have introduced a parameter nbit = fgate/fQ which accounts for the implementations
where nbit successive temporal modes are used to distinguish the states. It is nbit = 2
for COW and BB84 phase-time qubits, while for DPS nbit = 1. Whenever Alice chooses
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bn = 0, she prepares a quantum state corresponding to a bit value
|ψ (0, 0)〉n =
∣∣∣∣
√
µ
(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n
⊗
∣∣∣∣
√
ηIM · µ
(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n−1
|ψ (0, 1)〉n =
∣∣∣∣
√
ηIM · µ
(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n
⊗
∣∣∣∣
√
µ
(1 + ηIM)
〉
2n−1
(A.3)
Here, µ = |α2| is the mean value of the Poissonian distributed number of photons per
coherent state, and 0 ≤ ηIM ≤ 1 accounts for a limited extinction ratio of the intensity
modulator. In the ideal case it is ηIM = 0, and eq. (A.3) becomes
∣∣√µ〉 ⊗ |0〉 and
|0〉 ⊗ ∣∣√µ〉. Whenever Alice chooses bn = 1 with probability pDecoy a decoy sequence,
irrespective of the bit value she prepares
|ψ (1, 0)〉n = |ψ (1, 1)〉n = |
√
µ〉
2n
⊗ |√µ〉
2n−1
(A.4)
The goal of Alice and Bob is to maximize the COW secret key rate (per prepared
state) rsec which can be distilled from the transmitted and detected states
rsec =rdet · βsift · βest · fsec · βauth (A.5)
=rsift · (1− ηPE) · fsec · (1− ηMAC) (A.6)
where rdet is the detection rate (per prepared bit) in Bob’s detector SPDD. Further,
βsift, βest, fsec, βaut signify the key size reductions during sifting, parameter estimation,
privacy amplification and authentication, respectively. In the considered COW
implementation, a fraction βsift = (1− pDecoy) / (1 + pDecoy) of all detections in SPDD
is discarded during sifting. Furthermore, it is βest = 0.875 if we perform parameter
estimation based on sub-sampling, and βest = 1 if we estimate the QBER by key
comparison.
Including finite-key-size effects, the secret key fraction fsec under the assumption of
a restricted collective attack [26] is given for a QBER Q by the Devetak-Winter bound
fsec = 1− leakEC − leakVER
− (Q+ δQ)− (1−Q− δQ) · h
[
1 + ∆
2
]
− βsmooth − βEC − βPA (A.7)
The leakage of the error correction scheme leakEC is in the ideal case the binary entropy
h [Q], while in the implementation at present, leakEC = 1− fEC, with the chosen LDPC
code rate fEC ∈ {5/6, 3/4, 2/3, 1/2}. The leakage from the verification step after error
correction amounts to leakVER = l/b = 0.023 with l = 48 bits the length of each
verification hash tag, and b = 2048 bits the block length per verification. The overlap
∆ = |〈ψ1|ψ0〉| between the two bit states is for an observed visibility V
∆ =(2 · (V − δV )− 1) · e−µ
−2 ·
√
1− e−2·µ ·
√
(V − δV ) · (1− (V − δV )) (A.8)
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Due to the finite post-processing size we include statistical fluctuations of expected
QBER and visibility values, given by analysis based on interval estimation. For
parameter estimation based on sub-sampling, it is [33, 34]
δQ =
√
1 + ηPE · (nPP − 1)
(ηPE · nPP)2
· Log
[
1
ǫPE
]
(A.9)
In contrast, for parameter estimation based on key comparison, no uncertainty from
statistical fluctuations impair the QBER, i.e.
δQ = 0 (A.10)
However, in both cases the deducible visibility is limited by an uncertainty δV due to
the finite-key-size as
δV =
√
1
2
·
(
Log
[
1
ǫVPE
]
+ 2 · Log [nV + 1]
)
/nV (A.11)
nV is the number of useful detections in the monitor detector from which the visibility is
calculated. In the trusted detector scenario the secret key rate is optimized using QBER
and visibility values that are corrected for detector errors, which can not be exploited
or manipulated by an eavesdropper, e.g. dark counts. For the leakage term in eq. (A.7),
the uncorrected QBER value must be considered.
Furthermore, we account in equation (A.7) for the reduction βsmooth due to
uncertainty induced by smoothing the min-entropy, and the failure probabilities βEC
and βPA of the error correction and privacy amplification protocols [34]
βsmooth = 7 ·
√
log2
[
2
εSmooth
]
/nPP (A.12)
βEC = Log2
[
2
εEC
]
/nPP (A.13)
βPA = 2 · Log2
[
1
εPA
]
/nPP (A.14)
where the respective ε-parameters specify the confidence interval. For the presented
implementation, the key length after parameter estimation nPP = βest · nSIFT equals the
sifted key rate as no bit values are revealed for estimating Q. Instead, the errors are
measured by comparing the original bit string with the corrected one, which limits εEC
to the confidence interval of subsequent error verification (εEC = εVER = 8 · 10−11). The
total security parameter of the system is then fixed by the sum
εQKD = εsec = εVIS + εSmooth + εPA + 2 · εVER + εMAC = 4 · 10−9 (A.15)
Note the factor of two for εVER to account for failures in the QBER measure as well as
the verification step.
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As a first input parameter we fix the number of bits nSIFT after sifting entering
the further distillation post-processing which in our system is limited by the allocated
hardware memory to nSIFT = 995, 328 bits. From this number of bits the respective
number of useful detections nV in the monitoring detector which is used to estimate the
visibility is derived as
nV = nSIFT ·
pDecoy +
(1+pDecoy)2
4
1− pDecoy ·
(1− tB)
tB
(A.16)
Here, the first factor is the normalization since we use all useful monitor detections,
the second factor specifies the number of useful events due to decoy sequences and
combinations across bit separations, and the third factor accounts for the beam splitting
ratio. Any additional losses or differences in the detection efficiencies between data and
monitor detector can be incorporated by a respective choice of the beam splitting ratio tB
and detection efficiency ηD. Note that hypothetically, we assume an additional detector
at the bright interferometer port, however, in practice this detector is not necessary.
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